The Australian War Memorial did not appoint official war artists to go to Vietnam until 1967, due to the difficulty in drawing up a shortlist of artists and the fact that the artists would have to undergo the same rigorous training as the combat soldiers.
Everyone is terribly sorry about what the war is doing to Vietnam and the Vietnamese, especially since the cities have been brought into it, although somehow most of the official expressions of grief have about them that taint of Presidential sorrow, turning a little grinny around the edges. The Tet Offensive changed everything here, made this an entirely different war, made it Something Else. ("Nonsense," a colonel told me. "We're just doing the same things in the cities that we've done in the boonies, why … for years!" He was not the same man who said, "We had to destroy Bentre in order to save it," but he might have been. He'd be hip to that.) Before Tet, there was some clean touch to jungle encounters, some virtue to their brevity, always the promise of quick release from whatever horror there was. The war went on in bursts, meeting engagements; and covering it—particularly in the Highlands and the Delta, II Corps and IV Corps—you were always a tourist, a tripper who could summon up helicopters like taxis. You would taxi in, the war would break over you suddenly and then go away, and you would taxi out. Enough chances were taken to leave you exhilarated, and, except for the hangovers that any cheap thrill will give you, it was pleasant enough. Now, it is awful, just plain awful, awful without relief. (A friend on The New York Times told me that he didn't mind his nightmares so much as his waking impulse to file on them.) It has finally become that kind of conventional war that the Command so longed for, and it is not going well. And for every month that it continues not going well, the scope of its destruction is enlarged. We are not really a particularly brutal people, certainly no more brutal now than we've been in other wars, acquiring it as the war goes on. But our machine is devastating. And versatile. It can do almost everything but stop.
Whether or not Captain Herrick knew about the South Vietnamese commando raids, the administration knew very well that the North Vietnamese attack on the Maddox was provoked by these raids. At a National Security Council meeting in which the events of August 2 were reviewed, CIA director John McCone explained that the North Vietnamese “are reacting defensively to our attacks on the off-shore islands. They are responding out of pride and on the basis of defense considerations.” That understanding was never shared with the public. The U.S. had thrown the first punch and North Vietnam had punched back, without effect; but the public was led to believe that North Vietnam had attacked the strongest nation on earth without provocation.
by Thomas Tripp
The invasion of the Soviet Union arguably was the most important military decision Adolf Hitler made in his life.
Weather conditions were clear, and seas were calm. At 1440, the destroyer detected three North Vietnamese patrol boats approaching her position from the west. Aware of North Vietnamese intent from the earlier SIGINT [signals intelligence] message, Captain Herrick ordered gun crews to open fire if the fast-approaching trio closed to within 10,000 yards of the destroyer, and at about 1505 three 5-inch shots were fired across the bow of the closest boat. In return, the lead vessel launched a torpedo and veered away. A second boat then launched two “fish” but was hit by gunfire from the destroyer. Re-engaging, the first PT boat launched a second torpedo and opened fire with her 14.5-mm guns, but Maddox shell fire heavily damaged the vessel.
DeBenedetti, An American Ordeal, pp. 244-46, 248; Small, Antiwarriors, p. 105-106; and Max Frankel, “Nixon Has Begun Program to End War in Vietnam,” New York Times, April 6, 1969.
Frazier, Women’s Antiwar Diplomacy; and Michael J. Allen, “’Help Us Tell the Truth about Vietnam’: POW/MIA Politics and the End of the American War,” in Mark Bradley and Marilyn B. Young, eds., Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, and Transnational Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 258-50, 265-66.
Dellinger interview with Tom Wells, in Wells, The War Within, p. 162; and James W. Clinton, The Loyal Opposition: Americans in North Vietnam, 1965-1972 (Niwot, Colo.: University Press of Colorado, 1995).
Pham Van Chuong, quoted in Jessica Frazier, Women’s Antiwar Diplomacy during the Vietnam War Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), p. 3; Hershberger, Traveling to Vietnam; and Dagmar Wilson, “WSPers Return from Jakarta,” Memo 3, no. 24 (July 31, 1965), 2, quoted in Frazier, Women’s Antiwar Diplomacy, pp. 16-17.
Joseph A. Fry, “Unpopular Messengers: Student Opposition to the Vietnam War,” in David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends: New Perspectives on the Vietnam War (Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 2007), p. 233.
John S. Bowman, ed., The Vietnam War Day by Day (New York: Mallard Books, 1989), p. 89; and David Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt: G. I. Resistance during the Vietnam War (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 1975), p. 5.
Tom Valentine, “Vietnam War Draft” (National Archive statistics), . For a comprehensive review of draft resistance, see Michael Steward Foley, Confronting the War Machine: Draft Resistance during the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).
Thomas D. Snyder, ed., National Center for Education Statistics, “120 Years of American Education: A Statistical Portrait,” January 1993, pp. 83-84, ; Joseph A. Fry, “Unpopular Messengers: Student Opposition to the Vietnam War,” in David L. Anderson and John Ernst, The War That Never Ends: New Perspectives on the Vietnam War (Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 2007), p. 221; and Harris and Gallup polls, October and November 1969, cited in DeBenedetti, An American Ordeal, p. 264.
Mann, A Grand Delusion, p. 495; Michael Newton, The FBI Encyclopedia (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2003), p. 392; Wells, The War Within, p. 69; and U.S. Senate Historical Office, “January 24, 1966 Vietnam Hearings,” .